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T
 he Bank of Canada’s annual conference, held in
 November 2009, was part of a major research 
 program initiated in 2006 in anticipation of the 
next renewal of the inﬂ  ation-control agreement in 
2011. Although the current inﬂ  ation-targeting regime 
has served Canadians well, sound public policy 
demands the continuous exploration of possible 
improvements to the monetary policy framework. 
Research initially focused on two central questions 
regarding the design of monetary policy: (i) Would an 
inﬂ  ation target lower than our current 2 per cent target 
lead to better economic outcomes? (ii) What are the 
costs and beneﬁ  ts of price-level targeting relative to 
inﬂ  ation targeting? Given the recent experience with 
policy interest rates near zero, a heavier emphasis has 
been placed on the implications of the zero bound on 
  nominal interest rates for the design of the monetary 
policy framework.
Although the current inﬂ  ation-targeting 
regime has served Canadians well, 
sound public policy demands 
the continuous exploration of 
possible improvements to the 
monetary policy framework. 
The conference brought together distinguished 
scholars from academic institutions and monetary 
authorities around the world to discuss these 
questions.
Reﬂ  ecting the original questions asked in 2006, the 
conference agenda included work that shed new 
light on the potential costs and beneﬁ  ts of price-
level   targeting and on the optimal rate of inﬂ  ation. 
Other work explored the causes of zero-bound 
episodes and the efﬁ  cacy of potential policies. The 
conference consisted of two special presentations—
a luncheon address by Lawrence Christiano and the 
John Kuszczak Memorial Lecture delivered by 
Mark Gertler—together with six papers presented 
over three sessions with two discussants for each 
paper. The conference concluded with a panel dis-
cussion that reviewed the major themes and offered 
views on select topics.
1
Session I: The Zero Lower Bound
The events of the ﬁ  nancial crisis that began in 2007 
have highlighted the importance of the zero lower 
bound (ZLB) on nominal interest rates. In many 
advanced economies, central banks lowered their 
policy rates to what was considered the effective 
lower bound, constraining their ability to provide addi-
tional monetary stimulus. The frequency and severity 
of such episodes can have important implications for 
monetary policy design.
Standard dynamic stochastic general-equilibrium 
(DSGE) models suggest that the ZLB does not 
  signiﬁ  cantly constrain optimal policy. However, in 
their paper “Risk-Premium Shocks and the Zero 
Bound on Nominal Interest Rates,” Robert Amano 
and Malik Shukayev (Bank of Canada) argue that 
standard quantitative DSGE models do not fully 
capture the importance of the ZLB. They point to the 
experience of the recent crisis as one example. 
Amano and Shukayev show that one possible explan-
ation for this disconnect is that the standard models 
omit shocks to the risk premium. Such shocks drive 
up the rates of return on private assets relative to the 
policy rate. Risk-premium shocks were particularly 
prominent during the recent recession and historically 
1  Current versions of the papers presented are listed in the Literature Cited. Some 
of those still in manuscript form are available on the Bank’s website at 
<http://www.bankofcanada.ca/en/conference_papers/econ_conf09/papers.html>.
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can require a substantial reaction of the policy rate, 
thus making the ZLB a potentially important con-
straint. Other, more standard, shocks are not able to 
push nominal rates close to zero (e.g., shocks to 
productivity or government spending). Interestingly, 
Amano and Shukayev note that price-level targeting 
could help to manage the impact of risk-premium 
shocks because it leads to less variability in interest 
rates and, thus, fewer ZLB episodes.
Henry Siu (University of British Columbia) noted that 
in the real world, risk-premium shocks appear to 
cause both investment and consumption to fall. In the 
model, however, only investment falls in response to a 
positive risk-premium shock, while consumption rises. 
Siu noted that this discrepancy may be due to the fact 
that, in reality, movements in the risk premium are 
correlated with other shocks. He suggested that 
making the risk premium endogenous might remedy 
this issue. Steve Ambler (Université du Québec à 
Montréal) agreed that it would be helpful to endo-
genize the risk premium. He also conjectured that 
Amano and Shukayev’s main result may be an artifact 
of the way money is introduced in the model. In par-
ticular, Ambler noted that hitting the ZLB in the model 
would require money balances to become very large. 
Consequently, the elasticity of money demand would 
tend to inﬁ  nity. He argued that actual ZLB episodes 
provided little evidence to corroborate the latter 
  prediction of the model.
During the recent crisis, several central banks pro-
vided forward guidance about the path of their policy 
rate. For example, the Bank of Canada made a condi-
tional statement in April 2009 about the length of time 
that the policy rate would remain at its effective lower 
bound.
2 Much of the recent literature on monetary 
policy at the ZLB has suggested that forward guidance 
can be a very effective tool in preserving macro-
economic stability in the face of contractionary 
demand shocks (e.g., Eggertsson and Woodford 
2003). Indeed, this strand of the literature goes as far 
as to suggest that there may be little need for other 
types of unconventional monetary policy, such as 
quantitative or credit easing.
In their paper “Limitations on the Effectiveness of 
Forward Guidance at the Zero Lower Bound,” 
Andrew Levin, David López-Salido, Edward Nelson, 
and Tack Yun (Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System) use the prototypical New Keynesian 
model to investigate the extent to which the 
2  The statement was explicitly conditional on the outlook for inﬂ  ation.
effectiveness of forward guidance depends on the 
magnitude and persistence of shocks to the natural 
interest rate and the interest elasticity of aggregate 
demand. They ﬁ  nd that forward guidance is effective 
for shocks of moderate size and persistence but much 
less effective for larger and more persistent shocks. 
Moreover, the beneﬁ  ts of forward guidance are quite 
sensitive to assumptions about the interest elasticity 
of demand. They conclude that for an episode of the 
magnitude and persistence of the recent crisis in the 
United States, forward guidance alone is not very 
effective. They point to this result as a possible 
rationale for policies such as credit easing and ﬁ  scal 
stimulus.
Sharon Kozicki (Bank of Canada) noted that issues 
related to credibility and expectations formation could 
further limit the effectiveness of forward guidance. If 
the central bank does not have full credibility today 
that it will follow through on a policy commitment that 
binds only in the future, a much worse outcome might 
be obtained. Moreover, she noted that, in the presence 
of uncertainty, optimal policy includes state-contingent 
commitments, including state-contingent forward 
guidance. Kozicki suggested that this, combined with 
the time inconsistency of optimal policy, could pose 
signiﬁ  cant communications challenges for policy-
makers. Marc Giannoni (Columbia University) was 
skeptical of the authors’ conclusions regarding the 
limitations of forward guidance. He argued that for-
ward guidance was, in fact, very effective in their 
model. Giannoni pointed out that although outcomes 
with forward guidance were not good, they were 
much better than those without such guidance. 
Indeed, in the context of the model used by the 
authors, forward guidance can implement the best 
possible outcomes. Moreover, he contended that the 
authors did not make a convincing case for uncon-
ventional policy measures.
Luncheon Address
Lawrence J. Christiano (Northwestern University) 
gave the luncheon address “Implications of 2007–09 
for Monetary DSGE Models.” He identiﬁ  ed two main 
implications of the crisis for macroeconomic models: 
(i) the characterization of monetary policy, and (ii) the 
urgency of modelling ﬁ  nancial frictions.
Christiano argued that the crisis should lead the eco-
nomics profession to change the way it characterizes 
monetary policy in macroeconomic models. He noted 
that, before the crisis, policy was modelled as a 
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with asymmetric menu costs for wage setting that 
nests DNWR, downward real wage rigidity, standard 
menu costs, and ﬂ  exible wages. They estimate the 
model using a simulated method of moments to 
match key features of the cross-sectional wage 
distribution for various countries. Their ﬁ  ndings sug-
gest that optimal inﬂ  ation for European countries is 
between 0 and 2 per cent, while for the United States 
it is between 2 and 5 per cent.
David Andolfatto (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis) 
noted several caveats related to the dataset used by 
Fagan and Messina, including the fact that it includes 
wage changes only for continuing workers and that it 
ignores non-wage compensation. He also argued that 
the labour market might be better modelled as 
involving enduring relationships rather than as 
anonymous spot markets. In this case, the relevant 
concept is the wage proﬁ  le over the length of the 
relationship, not at a point in time. Michael Dotsey 
(Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia) noted that 
models in which employers do not observe labour 
effort also lead to fairly ﬂ  exible effective wages, even 
though measured wages are not ﬂ  exible. Moreover, he 
cited several other empirical studies that raise doubts 
about the existence of DNWR. Dotsey concluded that 
the prevalence of DNWR remains an open question.
In their presentation “Inﬂ  ation, Nominal Debt, 
Housing, and Welfare,” Shutao Cao, Césaire Meh, 
Yaz Terajima (Bank of Canada), and José-Víctor Ríos-
Rull (University of Minnesota and Federal Reserve Bank 
of Minneapolis) evaluate the welfare effects of 
lowering the long-run inﬂ  ation target in a life-cycle, 
heterogeneous-agent model of housing, nominal 
debt, and money. They assume that housing and 
debt transactions are costly, while money holdings 
are not subject to any transactions costs. This gives 
money a natural advantage as a vehicle for self-
insuring against idiosyncratic earnings risk. They ﬁ  nd 
that reducing the long-run rate of inﬂ  ation from 2 per 
cent to 1 per cent reduces the cost of holding 
money and therefore facilitates the use of money for 
self-insurance. They conclude that a reduction in the 
rate of inﬂ  ation would not only increase aggregate 
welfare in the long run, but would also improve the 
welfare of roughly 68 per cent of the population alive 
at the time of the change.
Peter Howitt (Brown University) noted that the model 
deals with only a one-time shock to inﬂ  ation: at all 
other times inﬂ  ation is constant and predictable. If the 
inﬂ  ation rate were subject to uncertainty, households 
would allocate their portfolios differently. He also 
procedure for adjusting a particular short-term interest 
rate. He suggested that, in light of the actual behaviour 
of central banks during the crisis, an escape clause 
for “exigent circumstances” should be added to the 
standard approach. He proposed a deﬁ  nition of exi-
gent circumstances that would require a drop in 
demand that leads to a ZLB episode and triggers a 
downward spiral of spending and inﬂ  ation.
He observed that during the crisis, the Federal Reserve 
took policy actions that led it to undertake private 
ﬁ  nancial intermediation. He suggested that the 
rationale for such policies might be some sort of 
externality that is operative only in unusual circum-
stances. He identiﬁ  ed a pecuniary externality oper-
ating through asset prices as one potential candidate.
Christiano also argued that the crisis has made clear 
that modelling ﬁ  nancial frictions must be a priority 
for macroeconomics. In particular, he noted that 
developing models with greater ﬁ  nancial detail would 
allow economists to address such issues as whether 
or not monetary policy should respond directly to 
ﬁ  nancial variables, and the importance of business-
cycle disturbances that originate in the ﬁ  nancial sector.
Christiano noted that recent work with models that 
include a ﬁ  nancial sector has already made some 
progress. As an example, he presented research 
showing that shocks that make borrowers more or 
less risky may be particularly important for business-
cycle ﬂ  uctuations.
Session II: Optimal Inﬂ  ation
Standard macroeconomic models suggest that the 
optimal rate of inﬂ  ation is zero, or even negative. Yet 
most central banks aim to maintain small positive 
rates of inﬂ  ation. One possible explanation for this 
observation is that it is difﬁ  cult to reduce nominal 
wages even when economic circumstances warrant a 
reduction. In the presence of downward nominal-wage 
rigidity (DNWR), a higher rate of inﬂ  ation will allow 
easier adjustment of real wages—it will “grease the 
wheels of the economy” (Tobin 1972). In this situation, 
a lower rate of inﬂ  ation will lead to real wages and 
unemployment that are higher, on average. In their 
paper “Downward Wage Rigidity and Optimal Steady-
State Inﬂ  ation,” Gabriel Fagan (European Central 
Bank) and Julián Messina (Universitat de Girona) 
review the international evidence on DNWR. They 
conclude that the evidence is consistent with DNWR 
in the United States, but that the ﬁ  ndings for Europe 
suggest that it is real wages that are downwardly 
rigid. To assess the implications of these ﬁ  ndings for 
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equity capital in the intermediary sector. In the model, 
a deterioration of the intermediaries’ capital disrupts 
lending and borrowing in a way that mimics what 
happened during the crisis. To study unconventional 
monetary policy, Gertler allowed the central bank to 
act as an intermediary, but assumed that public 
intermediation would generally be less efﬁ  cient than 
private intermediation. He showed that the welfare 
gains from interventions in credit markets could 
actually be quite large, as long as efﬁ  ciency costs 
are sufﬁ  ciently modest.
Session III: Price-Level Targeting
Recent research on monetary policy design has pro-
duced several results suggesting that price-level 
targeting (PLT) might yield better results than inﬂ  ation 
targeting (IT). The papers in this session evaluated the 
performance of PLT under alternative assumptions 
about price setting, and the effectiveness of PLT in 
managing tail risks.
Studies evaluating the efﬁ  cacy of monetary policy 
rules and regimes are often based on a benchmark 
New Keynesian model in which the parameters are 
assumed to be policy invariant. It is possible, 
however, that some key parameters may not be 
invariant to changes in monetary policy. In 
“Endogenous Rule-of-Thumb Price-Setters and 
Monetary Policy,” Robert Amano, Rhys Mendes, 
and Stephen Murchison (Bank of Canada) use a 
hybrid New Keynesian Phillips curve to examine the 
question of IT versus PLT when price-setters 
endogenously choose to behave either in an optimal 
forward-looking manner or to follow a simple rule of 
thumb for setting prices. Although other factors may 
also be endogenous, they focus on the degree of 
forward-looking behaviour, since it has been identiﬁ  ed 
in the literature as a crucial parameter affecting the 
performance of PLT versus IT. They allow ﬁ  rms in their 
model to choose between using a simple backward-
looking rule of thumb (RT) and paying a cost to set 
prices optimally in a forward-looking (FL) manner. 
They ﬁ  nd that the beneﬁ  ts (relative proﬁ  tability) of 
being FL versus RT depend on the regime. In their 
model, the success of PLT in stabilizing the economy 
makes the simple rule of thumb relatively more 
attractive, leading to an increase in RT behaviour. 
They show that this increase in RT behaviour could 
reduce the beneﬁ  ts of PLT over IT. They conclude that 
if a central bank fails to account for the impact of 
policy changes on the proportion of RT price-setters, 
outcomes can be signiﬁ  cantly worse than anticipated.
suggested modiﬁ  cations, including an explanation of 
the motivation behind the assumption of quadratic 
costs for bond transactions, the inclusion of other real 
assets in addition to housing, and the addition of 
longer-term bonds to the model. Finally, he expressed 
doubts about households using cash holdings to 
self-insure and argued that the cash holdings implied 
by the model were implausibly large.
John Kuszczak Memorial Lecture
Mark Gertler (New York University) delivered the 
2009 John Kuszczak Memorial Lecture, “A Model of 
Unconventional Monetary Policy.” 
3 He observed that 
over most of the postwar period, the Federal Reserve 
has conducted monetary policy by adjusting the 
federal funds rate in order to affect market interest 
rates—it has avoided lending directly in private 
credit markets. Since the onset of the crisis in August 
2007, the situation has changed dramatically, and the 
Fed has injected credit directly into private markets. 
Gertler cited statistics indicating that private assets 
held by the Fed had increased from virtually nothing 
to nearly $1.5 trillion. He noted that the Fed had taken 
these actions in an attempt to offset a considerable 
fraction of the decline in private ﬁ  nancial intermedia-
tion by expanding central bank intermediation.
Gertler pointed out that whenever the short-term 
interest rate is at the zero lower bound, central banks 
are unable to stimulate the economy using conven-
tional means. In these situations, they must rely 
exclusively on unconventional balance-sheet oper-
ations. He noted, however, that the baseline versions 
of standard models assume frictionless ﬁ  nancial 
markets. Accordingly, these models are unable to 
capture ﬁ  nancial-market disruptions that could 
motivate the type of central bank interventions in loan 
markets observed during the crisis. To remedy this 
situation, he presented a quantitative macroeconomic 
model in which it is possible to analyze the effects of 
unconventional monetary policy.
Gertler’s model incorporated ﬁ  nancial intermediaries 
within an otherwise standard macroeconomic frame-
work. He assumed a simple agency problem between 
intermediaries and their depositors in order to generate 
an effect from the balance sheets of intermediaries on 
the overall ﬂ  ow of credit. The agency problem intro-
duced endogenous constraints on the leverage ratios 
3  This lecture is funded by the Bank of Canada in memory of our colleague 
John Kuszczak, who died in 2002.
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Michael Woodford (Columbia University).
Michael Woodford discussed four related issues: 
(i) the desirability of a price-level target, (ii) the import-
ance of forward guidance, (iii) reconsideration of 
optimal inﬂ  ation targets, and (iv) a role for “unconven-
tional policy.” On the desirability of price-level   targeting, 
Woodford noted that recent research implies that PLT 
is optimal in the presence of cost-push shocks and a 
good approximation to optimal policy in the presence 
of cost-push shocks and a zero bound on nominal 
interest rates. Work presented at the conference did 
little to sway Woodford from these conclusions.
Woodford argued in favour of forward guidance (and 
PLT) and questioned the conclusions of Levin et al., 
who compared the commitment policy with an 
unattainable ﬁ  rst-best policy instead of the more 
relevant comparison between commitment and purely 
forward-looking policy. The real issue concerning the 
application of forward guidance and PLT, according 
to Woodford, is whether the central bank can assume 
full credibility or rational expectations, since their 
absence would impinge on the efﬁ  cacy of forward 
guidance and PLT. He noted, however, that not all 
ways of moving away from full rational expectations 
weaken the case for PLT.
The zero bound on nominal interest rates is an issue 
that has led some to argue in favour of higher inﬂ  ation 
targets. Woodford pointed out that this is a very inefﬁ  -
cient solution to the zero-bound problem if history-
dependent policy can be made credible. He noted 
that a good policy should promise temporary re-
inﬂ  ation (after a deﬂ  ation) but not permanently higher 
inﬂ  ation, and that PLT is a regime that allows for this. 
PLT, moreover, may be a good way to explain how 
temporary re-inﬂ  ation can be consistent with a com-
mitment to low inﬂ  ation. On the ﬁ  nal point, Woodford 
sees a case for active credit policy when interest rates 
approach their zero bound, since policy rates can no 
longer be used to help offset potential distortions in 
credit markets.
Vincent Reinhart began by discussing the traditional 
problems with price-level drift. That is, the presence 
of drift fails to anchor nominal levels; impedes cred-
ibility, since bygones are bygones; and limits the 
effectiveness of stabilization policy. Reinhart argued 
that, given these problems with base drift, PLT may 
be a useful monetary policy framework, especially in 
regard to stabilization.
He noted, however, that communication issues may 
hinder the usefulness of PLT. In particular, he argued 
Ricardo Reis (Columbia University) began by pointing 
out that the literature on monetary policy design has 
identiﬁ  ed a very substantial set of potential beneﬁ  ts of 
PLT relative to IT. Yet, PLT is almost never implemented 
in practice. Reis argued that this puzzle is one of the 
largest gaps between the theory and practice of 
  monetary policy. He went on to question the gener-
ality of the results presented by Amano, Mendes, 
and Murchison. In particular, he noted that the rule of 
thumb assumed by the authors may, in fact, change 
with the policy regime. In addition, he argued that the 
cost of behaving in a forward-looking manner 
should be included as a resource cost in the model. 
Frank Smets (European Central Bank) agreed with 
these points. He also suggested endogenizing some 
of the parameters of the rule of thumb and consid-
ering some alternative policy rules and feedback 
horizons.
Roberto Billi (Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City) 
then presented his evaluation of the “risk-manage-
ment” properties of PLT in “Price-Level Targeting and 
Risk Management in a Low-Inﬂ  ation Economy.” He 
notes that low inﬂ  ation implies low nominal interest 
rates and a greater probability of hitting the ZLB. 
Thus, downside risks to the economy are greater 
when inﬂ  ation is low. He demonstrates that PLT miti-
gates downside tail risks relative to IT, while gener-
ating only slightly worse outcomes, on average. He 
concludes that PLT is a more effective policy frame-
work than IT for the management of downside tail 
risks in a low-inﬂ  ation economy.
Kevin Moran (Université Laval) suggested that Billi 
formalize the idea that reducing downside tail risks 
should be considered desirable. He also expressed 
surprise that IT dominated PLT in the model in terms 
of average welfare. He argued that this result may be 
due to the use of ﬁ  rst-difference interest rate rules in 
the model. Gauti Eggertsson (Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York) agreed that the ﬁ  rst-difference rules 
were the source of the surprising welfare result. He 
noted that what really mattered in the model was the 
degree of history dependence in the policy rule, not 
the speciﬁ  c source of the history dependence. 
Eggertsson also argued that the fact that PLT 
appeared to be more robust against “deﬂ  ationary 
black holes” could be a rationale for PLT over IT.
Panel Discussion
The conference concluded with discussion by a 
panel consisting of John Murray (Bank of Canada), 
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guidance may be limited in the face of a serious 
shock, downward nominal-wage rigidity may be more 
signiﬁ  cant than we think, and endogenous pricing 
behaviour may reduce the beneﬁ  ts of PLT. The 
second camp painted a more positive picture: distri-
butional and equity arguments support a lower rate of 
inﬂ  ation, PLT may be helpful insurance against down-
side tail risks, and unconventional monetary policies 
can work.
Our success with inﬂ  ation targeting has 
raised the bar for a move to another, 
potentially better, framework for 
monetary policy.
To conclude, Murray asked a ﬁ  nal question: What do 
we need to know? With regard to optimal inﬂ  ation, he 
suggested that more work on the frequency of future 
zero-bound episodes and the effectiveness of uncon-
ventional policies would be useful. He also wondered 
whether we need to revise our thinking on downward 
nominal-wage rigidity. With regard to PLT, Murray 
asked if economic agents would value greater price-
level certainty and if there is a way to test whether 
agents would understand PLT and change their 
behaviour accordingly. Finally, he talked about the 
puzzle mentioned by Ricardo Reis in his discussion 
and the fact that our success with inﬂ  ation targeting 
has raised the bar for a move to another, potentially 
better, framework for monetary policy.
that policy-makers may be reluctant to adopt PLT 
because they lack conﬁ  dence in their ability to convey 
information to the public about more than a single 
factor. For example, they may be concerned about 
their ability to communicate how policy would be 
conducted in a different economic situation or how it 
might differ in the future relative to the present.
John Murray ﬁ  rst returned to the two original ques-
tions mentioned in the Bank of Canada’s 2006 
background document on the renewal of the inﬂ  ation 
targets. That is, (i) should the inﬂ  ation target be lower 
than 2 per cent? and (ii) should we move to a price-
level target? To put these questions in context, he 
also discussed things that we thought we knew in 
2006: (i) measurement bias and nominal wage rigidities 
were not major concerns; (ii) the main impediment to 
a lower inﬂ  ation target was the ZLB on nominal 
interest rates, which, based on past experience and 
work at that time, was probably rare and manageable; 
and (iii) according to model simulations and the 
plausibility of the arguments, PLT seemed to be a 
promising idea with the added beneﬁ  t that it might 
help deal with zero-bound episodes.
Murray then turned to the question, What have we 
learned since then? To answer this, Murray used the 
recent crisis and associated events, including the 
application of unconventional monetary policies as an 
(unexpected) natural experiment. He concluded that 
there may be inconsistency between some of the 
tentative conclusions drawn from previous research 
and recent real-world events. Murray then turned to 
the conference papers and divided them into two 
camps. The ﬁ  rst camp offered cautionary messages: 
namely, zero-bound episodes may be more frequent 
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